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Abstract—This paper proposes a new authentication model based 
on CL-PKC technology (Certificateless public key cryptography) 
in peer-to-peer systems. With the progress in peer-to-peer 
technology, lots of things related to the security problems of peer-
to-peer systems have been exposing. To solve these security 
problems, authentication must be settled firstly. So this paper 
develops an authentication method based on CL-PKC technology, 
considering the dynamic properties of hybrid peer-to-peer 
systems. This method simplifies the procedure of getting public 
keys and authentication procedure, so the efficiency is increased, 
and the mount of bandwidth required is lower. This method is 
very fit to the systems with limited resources. (Abstract) 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 With the advent of Naspster, the peer-to-peer era has come. 
Because of storing of resource indexes in a server, Naspster 
was shut down by law. But people, who had fallen love with 
this technology, still fellow this technology. Researchers start 
to design structured and unstructured peer-to-peer network 
topology and to increase the efficiency, and so on. [1] 
proposes the pure unstructured peer-to-peer network topology 
(Gnutella), which aparts from the limitation of center servers. 
But there are still some problems, such as "The small world "[5] , 
the heterogeneity of nodes[3,4] Free Riding[2] and so on. And 
then  many unstructured peer-to-peer network topologies, such 
as KaZaA、eDonkey、Freenet and so on, appear. 
Accompanying the emergence of the unstructured peer-to-
peer system topology, structured peer-to-peer systems also 
appeared. Such as Chord6] ，CAN [7] ，Tapestr[8] and so on. 
Beside these topologies, hybrid peer-to-peer system topology 
also been promoted, such as Pastry[9,10]. But there are still 
many problems to be settled. For example, considering the 
number of files shared, the fact is that as high as 25% users are 
not sharing any file in Gnutella, about 75% users sharing less 
than 100, and only 7% users sharing more than 1000 files. By 
contrary, the number of the files shared by the only 7% users 
is more than the sum of the files shared by the other 93% users 
[16]. 
Researchers bring the conception－reputation into peer-to-
peer systems. Peer-to-peer systems vary the quality of services 
by their different reputation value. But if we want to use the 
reputation value, peer-to-peer systems must design user 
authentication procedure firstly. To build a safe peer-to-peer 
environment, we must try to find an authentication solution. 
These exiting peer-to-peer systems have adopted some 
authentication methods. In Napster[20], the system supports 
two authentication methods: one method is that every user has 
a nick name and associative secret key, so the system can 
verify the secure key to identity the user ; the other method, 
when the system sending messages to users, is that the system 
uses a one direction Hash (md5) function to sign messages. In 
Mangomind[21] , every person must present the invention 
before joining the peer-to-peer system. After passing through 
the verification of invention, the user generates his 
public/private key, and then sends the public key to the peer-
to-peer system to simplify the procedure of the authentication 
of users. In WebRiposte[22] , the authentication is realized 
based on the Windows NT/2000 security model. In Groove[23], 
the authentication of users also need the support of 
public/private key. 
In the academic, researchers also pay attention to the study 
of authentication in peer-to-peer environments. [24] proposes 
a duel authentication based on distributed Hash. [25] proposes 
a public key management infrastructure in a two-tier hybrid 
peer-to-peer system to fulfill the users’ authentication. [26] 
proposes a distributed authentication service based on 
public/private key. 
They all share the PKI infrastructure. So the verification of 
the binding between public key and ID is need. This paper 
puts forward the authentication model based on CL-PKC[27,28] 
in peer-to-peer environments, solves the problems with 
certification. It simplifies the authentication procedure, 
increases the efficiency and lowers the mount of bandwidth. 
This paper is organized as follows: first section presents an 
introduction of the need of authentication in peer-to-peer 
systems and the progress in this field; second section presents 
a detailed introduction of authentication in peer-to-peer system 
at present; third section presents the system's components, its 
building procedure and the security analysis; fourth section 
presents some conclusions and future study. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Authentication methods can be divided into two main 
categories. One is authentication of node identifications, which 
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is to confirm whether the node identification is valid. Another 
is an authentication of user permissions, which is to confirm 
whether the user can use the service. In  this paper, we focus on 
the first, and authentication means validating a message by 
using e-signature generated by the private key based on CL-
PKC. 
An exiting authentication method called PKI[30] is the most 
famous method to authentication nodes. But PKI enables an 
authentication with servers called CA, and needs CA to certify 
the correctness of public key. In this procedure, we need to 
construct a certification chain, and then certify the public key 
along the chain. Considering the dynamic nodes joining and 
leaving in peer-to-peer systems, so traditional authentication 
methods (PKI) do not fit to provide authentication service in 
peer-to-peer systems. 
[24] considers the dynamic feather associating with the 
nods in peer-to-peer systems, so excludes the use of CA and 
introduces the distributed management of public keys. The 
distributed management of public keys is based on hash called 
HADM, which constructs its route table relying on to Web of 
Trust and DHT. So HDAM can be used in any system to fulfill 
the efficient distributed authentication. Users must search 
public keys; as a result, the higher communication cost is 
needed. The route table is also constructed based on unsafe 
Web of Trust, so this system's safety can not be guaranteed. 
[26] proposes a distributed authentication service called 
CorSSO. CorSSO grants authentication to a group of 
authentication servers. Each application server S selects a 
subset of the authentication servers by authentication policy to 
operate the authentication to application server S. 
Authentication servers are more likely to exhibit independence 
when they are managed by separate entities, which are 
physically separated. But this paper is based on PKI; it must 
solve the authority of the public key using certification chain. 
[25] proposes public key management framework to 
distribute public key safely without PKI infrastructure for two-
tier super peer architecture. In order to build the system, users 
must generate their own public/private keys and then send 
some messages to authentication servers. This mechanism must 
store users' messages and respond to users' request. So the 
center server may fail. 
This paper authenticates super peers and common peers 
through PKG. Users can get public keys send by other nodes, 
not by making request to servers. And we can certify the 
authenticity of public keys locally not remotely, resulting lower 
load in authentication server and lower bandwidth requirement. 
So this mechanism is very fit to resources limited environment. 
III. TARGET SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
We propose a three-tier peer-to-peer system based on CL-
PKC technology (PKG authentication center, super peer layer, 
common peer layer). PKG is responsible for the authentication 
of super peers and common peers. In super peer layer, we use 
the Chord topology to organize super peers, and to place and 
search resources or peers; a common peer is a client belonging 
to a super peer, and is the supplier and consumer of resources.  
Chord Circle








Figure 1 the overview of the P2P system 
The building procedure of peer-to-peer system consists of 
PKG center building procedure, super peer building procedure 
and common peer building procedure. 
A. PKG CENTER BUILDING PROCEDURE AND SUPER PEER 
BUILDING PROCEDURE 
According to [27][28], PKG center (A) generates its own 
system parameters <G1,G2,e,n,P,P0,H1,H2> and master key    s
∈Zq*. 
Super peer (B) sends a message (msg1) encapsulated with 
his own ID to PKG (A) center through a secret channel 
(Kerberso) to get its partial private key and public key. When 
PKG gets the requisition (msg1) from super peer, PKG using 
formula (1) calculates the partial private key and public key, 
and then sends a message (msg2) back to super peer through a 
secure channel. The requestor (B) receives the feedback 
message (msg2) from PKG, and use equation (2) to certify the 
correctness of the message. If the verification is passed, super 
peer (B) uses equation (3) to compute his own private key and 
public key. 
Q = H1( ID ) ∈ G1*  (1) 
D = sQ ∈ G1*   (2) 
e( D,P ) = e( Q, P0 )  (3) 
   After super peer (B) gets his own private/public key, all 
messages sent by him can be certified by signatures. If super 
peer (B) plans to send a message to super (C), B must get A's 
public key at first. The procedure is as Figure 2. 
TABLE I.  EQUATION OF VARABKLES 
VARABLE 
NAME FORMULA 
msg < ID, <X,Y> , i ,C > 
M H1 (ID || <X, Y> || i ) 
C SigS ( M ) 
 
 
Figure 2 the communication procedure 
TABLE II.  COMPUTE  AND CHECK SIGNAGTURES 
Tasks super peer B  does when 
sending message msg1 
Task super peer C does after sending 
message msg1(assuming C=<U,V>) 
1. random select r ∈ Zq* 
1. check XB,YB∈ Gq* and 
 e(XB, P0)=e(YB,P),then continue,else 
exit. 
2. compute  
MB  = H1 (IDB || <XB, YB> || iB ) 
2. compute 
QB=H1(IDB) ∈ Gq* 
3. random select  r ∈ Zq* 
3. compute signature  
CB = <rP,MB ⊕ H2(e(SB,rP))> 
4. computer signature 
V ⊕ H2(QB,YB)r) 
= MB 
 
       After C gets msg1, he can compute: 
MB’  = MB  = H1 (IDB || <XB, YB> || iB ) 
       If  MB’  = MB holds, B's public key held by C is true. B also 
can get C's public key after receiving msg2. Super nodes can 
authenticate each other by signatures. 
B. Common peer building 
• Common peer joining. Every common peer has his 
own identity ID in the peer-to-peer system. Peer1 want 
to join the system, firstly he must choose his own 
identity IDD, and then send this own message to Super 
Node (B) through Kerberos protocol; Super Node (B) 
receives the "joining" message and transfers the 
message to PKG (A). PKG using equation (2) 
computes partial private key, and sends back it to 
Peer1 through super node (B) by a secure channel. 
Peer1 certifies the message received. If successes, 
Peer1 generates his own private key and public key 
using his own secret message and message send by 
super node (B). And then Peer1 sends his own resource 
indexes to Super Node (B). Super Node (B) stores 
these resource indexes and other messages. The 
procedure is like figure (2): 1, 2,3,4,5. 
• Common peer searching. Peer1 sends a message (msg) 
containing required resource name and other feathers 
to Super Node (B). After receiving the message (msg), 
Super Node (B) must certify the sender's identity and 
the integrity of the received message, and then process 
it (here we assume message will be sent to Super Node 
(C)). After receiving the message transferred by Super 
Node (B), Super Node (C) also checks the sender's 
identity and the integrity of the received message. If 
verification is passed, he searches required resource 
locally or otherwise sends the required message to 
other super peers. If the desired resource is found in 
Super Node (C), Super Node(C) will send information 
back to Super Node (B). After passing through 
checking sender's identity and integrity of message, 
Super Node (B) sends a message to Peer1. Peer1 gets 
the replied message, and then checks sender's identity 
and integrity of the message. If verification is passed, 
the procedure is finished. The procedure is like figure 
(2): 6,7,8,9. 
• Common peer downloading. If Peer1 wants to 
download some resources locating in Peer2, Peer1 can 
send message to Peer2. After receiving the request 
from Peer1, Peer2 must certify user's authenticity and 
the integrity of the message. If they are all right, Peer2 
sends message to Pee1. If they can make sure of each 
other's true identity, they can continue the downloading 
according with some predefined policies. The 
procedure is like figure (2): 10, 11. 
C. ANALYSIS OF TARGET SYSTEM 
If Pee1 want to communicate with Peer2, Peer1 holds dirty 
public key associated with Peer2. The table shows the real 
message.  




Peer1 Peer2 Peer3 
ID IDE IDF IDG 
PUBLIC KEY <XE,YE> <XF,YF> <XG,YG> 
PRIVATE KEY SE SF SG 
 
• Public key exchange. If Peer3 catches the message 
destined to Peer1, which is send by Peer2, and changes 
the public key to his. Assume Peer1 receive the 
message < IDF , <XG,YG> , i , C = SigSG ( M ) >, M = 
H1( IDF ||<XG,YG>|| i ) and do certification as follow: 
V ⊕  H2 ( e(QF , YG)r  ) 
= V ⊕  H2 ( e (QF, XGsP) r ) 
= V ⊕  H2 ( e (XGsQF , P) r )           (1) 
= V ⊕  H2 ( e (SF’, P) r ) 
= M F’ 
Because MF != MF’ holds true, so Peer1 can determine 
the received public key not belonging to Peer2.  
• Super Node not safety. Although super node holds 
some partial private key, it can not get common peer's 
private key. This is equal that a person knowing 
system's parameters  <G1,G2,e,n,P,P0,H1,H2>、Q = 
H1( ID )∈G1* 、D = sQ∈G1* and P=<X=xP,Y= 
xsP> computes the value x[28]. Because this problem 
can not be solved at present, super node can not get 
users ' private key. 
• Defend DDOS attack. Because of the dynamic 
properties of peer-to-peer systems, we hope users can 
get their own public/private keys automatically. If 
users get their key directly, the PKG is easy to be 
attacked by DDOS. This paper lets super peer position 
between users and PKG to avoid those accidents. This 
mechanism puts PKG behind, so the probability to be 
attached is lower. This solution is based the safety of 
super nodes. 
• Replay attack. This system can defend the replay 
attack, because message generated by the system hold 
a field i which makes system safe. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper proposes an authentication model based on CL-
PKC in peer-to-peer systems, and also analysis some ordinary 
attacks. This model has advantages over traditional models, 
such as: 1) compared with traditional PKI authentication 
mechanisms, this system can get public key not by requiring, 
and certify the public key locally, so it needs lower bandwidth 
to achieve higher security; 2) compared with distributed 
management of public key based on Web of Trust, this system 
gets higher level security; 3) this system do not need to store 
registered users' information resulting in relieving the 
requirement of hardware; 4) for adopting CL-PKC, this system 
can use a few resources to get the same level security as the 
traditional methods. We can continue our work with the 
integrity of information, reputation computation, access 
control, the global optimization and so on. 
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